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By 15 months of age infants are sensitive to violations of fairness norms as assessed via
their enhanced visual attention to unfair versus fair outcomes in violation-of-expectation
paradigms. The current study investigated whether 15-month-old infants select social
partners on the basis of prior fair versus unfair behavior, andwhether infants integrate social
selections on the basis of fairness with the race of the distributors and recipients involved
in the exchange. Experiment 1 demonstrated that after witnessing one adult distribute toys
to two recipients fairly (2:2 distribution), and another adult distribute toys to two recipients
unfairly (1:3 distribution), Caucasian infants selected fair over unfair distributors when both
distributors were Caucasian; however, this preference was not present when the fair actor
was Asian and the unfair actor was Caucasian. In Experiment 2, when fairness, the race
of the distributor, and the race of the recipients were fully crossed, Caucasian infants’
social selections varied as a function of the race of the recipient advantaged by the unfair
distributor. Speciﬁcally, infants weremore likely to select the fair distributor when the unfair
recipient advantaged the Asian (versus the Caucasian) recipient. These ﬁndings provide
evidence that infants select social partners on the basis of prior fair behavior and that
infants also take into account the race of distributors and recipients when making their
social selections.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to actively select social partners on the basis of rele-
vant characteristics critically shapes the acquisition of knowledge;
selecting social partners constrains the kinds of people to which
an individual is exposed which can, in turn, guide subsequent
attitudes and behaviors. A variety of research suggests that adults
systematically select social partners on the basis of several dimen-
sions, including an individual’s social history and an individual’s
social category membership. For example, adults prefer individu-
als who aremore generous toward others in economic games (Page
et al., 2005), and they tend to afﬁliate with social partners who are
similar to themselves in terms of race, age, and socioeconomic
status (McPherson et al., 2001). The roots of the tendency to select
social partners on the basis of social history and social category
membership canbe tracedback to childhood: children tend tohave
friends who are of the same gender (Martin and Fabes, 2001) and
of the same race (Katz, 2003). In experimental paradigms, children
preferentially select individuals who share characteristics with the
self (Shutts et al., 2013) and who previously acted cooperatively
over uncooperative individuals (Dunﬁeld et al., 2013).
A critical, unanswered question is whether infants also make
systematic social selections on the basis of relevant social dimen-
sions. Emerging evidence suggests that infants may consider social
history when selecting between two agents; when given the choice
between a prosocial puppetwhopreviously helped another puppet
retrieve a toy and an antisocial puppet who previously prevented
the puppet from retrieving a toy, 5-month-old infants pick the
prosocial puppet (Hamlin and Wynn, 2011). Moreover, when
given the opportunity to select toys associatedwith native language
speakers over those associated with non-native language speakers
(i.e., those who speak with an accent) infants prefer toys offered
by native language speakers, suggesting that infants may use social
category information to guide their social selections (Kinzler et al.,
2012).
The goal of the current study is to investigate infants’ abil-
ity to select social partners on the basis of social history, and to
investigate whether and how infants’ social selections are altered
when social history information conﬂicts with social category
information. In the present study, we operationalized social his-
tory in terms of whether an actor had previously distributed
toys equally or unequally to recipients. Past work with adults
suggests that a “principle of equality” (Deutsch, 1975) guides
adults’ social judgments and evaluations: that, all other things
considered, goods should be divided equally to recipients. In
the context of economic games, adults divide resources between
oneself and an anonymous social partner equally (Fehr and Fis-
chbacher, 2003; Henrich et al., 2005) and punish individuals who
do not do so and seek redistribute goods equally (Dawes et al.,
2007; Johnson et al., 2009). Recent studies suggest that infants
appear to be sensitive to fairness violations by 15 months of age
or earlier: after watching an individual distribute crackers to two
recipients in a violation-of-expectancy paradigm, infants show
enhanced attention to an unfair outcome (i.e., 1:3 distribution)
versus a fair outcome (2:2 distribution) suggesting they expect
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goods to be distributed equally (Schmidt and Sommerville, 2011;
Sommerville et al., 2013; see also Geraci and Surian, 2011; Sloane
et al., 2012).
The novel question addressed in this study was whether infants
could use prior information about an individual’s fair versus unfair
behavior to guide their own selection of social partners. If so,
these ﬁndings would add to the current literature by demonstrat-
ing that infants are not only aware of fairness norms as reﬂected
by their expectations of third-party interactions, but also that
infants use their awareness of such norms to guide their social
behavior.
In addition to asking whether infants consider an individual’s
prior history of fair and unfair behavior in making their social
selections, we askedwhether information about the social category
membership of an individual affects infants’ social selections. In
the current study, we operationalized social category membership
in terms of the race of the individuals, as adults systematically
use race as an indicator of social category membership (Fiske and
Neuberg, 1990; Hewstone et al., 1991; Stangor et al., 1992). Evi-
dence suggests that same-race social preferences are in place by the
school-aged years: elementary-aged children reveal a racial bias in
their friendships and in peer nominations, preferring same-race
peers (Aboud et al., 2003; Bellmore et al., 2007).Work using exper-
imental paradigms also demonstrates that the impact of race on
children’s social preferences can be traced back to at least the early
preschool years. Three- to ﬁve-year-old children systematically
select same-race unfamiliar peers and adults as potential friends
over those of another race (Katz and Kofkin, 1997; Kinzler and
Spelke, 2011). Moreover, children prefer others who exclusively
afﬁliate with members of their ingroup: Caucasian preschoolers
selectively preferred characters in vignettes who were depicted
playingwith otherCaucasian characters as potential friends, rather
than those depicted with Black characters (Castelli et al., 2007). In
addition to possessing race-based social preferences children as
young as three also show adult-like implicit race biases in an age-
appropriate version of the Implicit Association Task (Dunham
et al., 2013).
We were motivated to investigate the impact of race on infants’
social selections as current research suggests infants show an early
sensitivity to race in their attentional patterns. Evidence from
visual preference studies suggests that race inﬂuences infants’ look-
ing preferences for different faces: infants as young as 3 months
of age prefer to look at same-race over other-race faces (Kelly
et al., 2005). Existing research on social selections based on race
in infancy, however, has yielded mixed results. On the one
hand, preliminary ﬁndings using live, interactive paradigms with
12-month-old infants indicate thatCaucasian infants prefer to take
toys offered by Caucasian versus Asian individuals when given no
other information about the individuals (Shin et al., 2011). On the
other hand, Kinzler and Spelke (2011) found that 10-month-old
infants selected toys associated with a Caucasian adult at equal
rates as toys associated with a Black adult, providing no evidence
for race-based social selections in infancy. Thus, the extent to
which infants consider race in their social selections is an open
question.
In advance of priorwork, the current study sought to investigate
whether and how infants integrate multiple dimensions – fairness
and race – in making their social selections. In the real world,
individuals often select social partners under conditions in which
different social dimensions are either in conﬂict or conﬂated.
Thus, we investigated whether and how infants integrate different
dimensions of social information into their social decision-making
processes. Experiment 1 investigated whether infants would select
individuals on the basis of previously fair behavior when the race
of the two individuals was controlled for (i.e., both were Cau-
casian), and when the fair individual was of a different race than
the unfair actor and the infant (i.e., the fair actor was Asian and
the unfair actor was Caucasian). These manipulations allowed us
to ask whether infants had a baseline preference for fair over unfair
individuals, and how and whether this preference was affected by
the race of the distributors.
In Experiment 2, we fully crossed fairness with the race of both
the distributors and the recipients. Thus, in this study infants had
the opportunity to select distributors on the basis of prior fair
or unfair behavior, on the basis of race, or on the basis of the
consequences of the distributors’ actions for their own or other
race members. Critically, this experiment allowed us to assess
how infants make social selections when faced with competing
motivations: concerns about adherence to socio-moral norms,
motivations to interact with individuals of the same social cat-
egory, and considerations of the outcomes of distributive actions
for self and same-race members. Past research suggests that each
of these factors not only independently affect adult’s and children’s
behavior and social selections, but can also interact in interesting
ways to impact social preferences. For example, adults preferred
a person who distributed difﬁcult tasks within a group fairly
compared to one who distributed such tasks unfairly. However,
this preference for the fair distributor was diminished when the
unfair distributor divided the tasks in a way that disadvantaged an
outgroup member. Under those circumstances, adults endorsed
the fair and unfair distributors at equal rates, suggesting adults’
evaluations of the distributors were affected by competing consid-
erations, namely, the fairness of the distributor and the impact of
his distribution on outgroup members (Platow et al., 1997).
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 inform
whether infants use prior fair and unfair behavior to guide their
social selections and how and whether this information is used to
guide social selections in the face of competing motivations.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we investigated infants’ social selections of fair
versus unfair distributors, and whether such selections varied as
a function of the race of the distributors. In one condition, both
distributors were Caucasian and both recipients were Asian. This
context provides a particularly stringent test of infants’ fairness
concerns. First, examining infants’ social selections after observ-
ing third-party interactions circumvents reward history issues
that can arise in the context of ﬁrst-person interactions. Second,
other scholars have argued that the expectation that norms extend
across social categories is a hallmark of moral principles (versus
social conventions; see Turiel, 1983). Prior work demonstrates
that infants of this age show sensitivity to violations to fairness
norms in their visual responses, and that such sensitivity relates to
infants’ prosocial behavior (e.g., Schmidt and Sommerville, 2011;
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Sommerville et al., 2013), suggesting that infants may view
fair distributions of goods as not only conforming to a social
convention but also to a moral rule or principle. Thus, we
expected infants to systematically select the fair actor in this
condition.
In a second condition, we pitted fairness against race by inves-
tigating infants’ selections of a fair Asian distributor versus an
unfair Caucasian distributor. Past work using similar paradigms
provides evidence that Caucasian infants have a baseline prefer-
ence for Caucasian over Asian individuals in the absence of any
other information about these individuals (Shin et al., 2011). In
this condition, there are three potential outcomes. First, infants
may make social selections strictly on the basis of the distrib-
utors’ previously fair (versus unfair) behavior and ignore race,
systematically selecting the fair actor. Second, infants may make
selections strictly on the basis of race, in which case we predicted
that infants would select the unfair Caucasian distributor over
the fair Asian distributor, given prior work suggesting that Cau-
casian infants prefer Caucasian to Asian faces (Kelly et al., 2005)
and Caucasian to Asian individuals (Shin et al., 2011). Third,
these pieces of information may compete with one another, in
which case infants may select the Asian fair distributor (versus
the Caucasian unfair distributor) at rates roughly equivalent to
chance.
Distributors in the current study were Caucasian or Asian.
In order to make same- versus other- race comparisons, and
because the population from which our sample was drawn was
predominantly Caucasian, we limited our sample to Caucasian
infants.
METHODS
Participants
Forty 15-month-old Caucasian infants participated in Experiment
1 (22 females; mean age= 15months, 12 days, range= 14months,
26 days to 16 months, 2 days). Infants were randomly assigned
to the Caucasian Fair/Caucasian Unfair condition (henceforth
CF/CUF; n = 20, 10 females, mean age = 15 months, 10 days) or
the Asian Fair/Caucasian Unfair condition (henceforth AF/CUF;
n = 20, 12 females, mean age = 15 months, 13 days). All
infants were full-term and typically developing. Participants were
recruited from a database of parents who had volunteered to par-
ticipate in experimental studies. Data from 18 additional infants
were excluded because of failure to respond at all during the choice
trials (n = 5 in the CF/CUF condition, n = 9 in the AF/CUF),
fussiness (n = 1 in the CF/CUF condition, n = 2 in the AF/CUF),
or due to procedural errors (n = 1 in the CF/CUF condition).
Procedure
The infant viewed a distribution phase followed by three choice
trials1.
Distribution. The infant watched a live distribution that involved
four actors: two distributors (both Caucasian for the CF/CUF con-
dition; one Caucasian and one Asian for the AF/CUF condition)
and two recipients (both Asian)2. Table 1 describes the respective
role as of the distributor and recipient as a function of fairness and
race for both Experiments 1 and 2.
The infant was seated in the parent’s lap roughly 60 cm from
the display table. The parent sat in a rolling chair that allowed the
parent to change location or orientation when instructed by the
experimenter. Before each distribution episode began, the parent
was instructed to turn to orient away from the table so that neither
the parent nor the infant could see the display. The parent was also
instructed to gaze neutrally at the top of the infant’s head and to
avoid interacting with their infant during the procedure.
During the distribution, the infant watched a total of four
distribution episodes: two that resulted in fair outcomes (a 2:2
distribution of toys) and two that resulted in unfair outcomes (a
1:3 distribution of toys). The distribution outcomes alternated,
and each distributor consistently allocated toys either fairly (2:2),
or unfairly (1:3). The recipient of the lesser distribution for the
unfair outcome was consistent across both episodes. The distri-
bution episodes were conducted such that each distributor was
unaware of whether she was the fair or unfair distributor to avoid
1These trials were embedded in a larger set of social tasks. Because response rates in
other tasks were low (e.g., less than 25% of infants provided responses), we focused
our analyses on these three trials.
2Past studies have conﬂated individual identity with category membership by uti-
lizing only one exemplar of the category and drawing inferences about the entire
category (e.g., one black person and one white person, Kinzler and Spelke, 2011; one
male and one female, Rind and Bordia, 1996). Thus, it may be the case that those
ﬁndings represent preferences for particular individuals, rather than preferences for
particular social groups. To avoid this conﬂation, and to ensure we were investigat-
ing the selection of individuals on the basis of engaging in past behaviors and on
the basis of category membership, we used multiple Caucasian and Asian actors to
play distributors and recipients across the two studies. Actors were randomly paired
with one another, constrained by the race required for a given condition. Roughly
half of the time a given actor acted as the fair (versus unfair) distributor. In Experi-
ment 2, when a given actor was the unfair distributor, roughly half of the time she
advantaged the Caucasian (versus Asian) recipient.
Table 1 | Race of distributors and recipients as a function of condition and experiment.
Condition (Experiment) Fair distributor Unfair distributor Advantaged recipient Disadvantaged recipient
CF/CUF (Experiment 1) Caucasian Caucasian Asian Asian
AF/CUF (Experiment 1) Asian Caucasian Asian Asian
CF/AUF: CR+ (Experiment 2) Caucasian Asian Caucasian Asian
CF/AUF: AR+ (Experiment 2) Caucasian Asian Asian Caucasian
AF/CUF: CR+ (Experiment 2) Asian Caucasian Caucasian Asian
AF/CUF: AR+ (Experiment 2) Asian Caucasian Asian Caucasian
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experimental bias. This feature of the distribution phase is a crit-
ical part of the procedure because if distributors are aware of the
outcomes of their actions, this awareness may (inadvertently or
unconsciously) inﬂuence their behavior on the test trials in subtle
ways that can be hard to detect (e.g., the fair actor being slightly
more positive toward the infant, etc.), whichmay artifactually cre-
ate the experimental effect. Our procedure allows us to bypass this
possibility.
To begin the distribution, the experimenter instructed the par-
ent to turn to face the display table. One distributor and two
recipients were seated at the table. The distributor knelt behind
the table such that the table occluded any actions below her
waist. Recipients were seated on either side of the distributor. All
actors gazed neutrally down until the procedure began. After a 3-s
delay (to ensure the infant was attending to the display table), a
distribution episode began.
In the greeting phase, the distributor greeted the infant by say-
ing, “Hello.” Next, the distributor greeted the recipient to her
left, saying “Hi” and the recipient looked up and said “Hello.”
The distributor and the recipient to her right repeated this
procedure.
In the distribution phase, the distributor lifted up a transpar-
ent bin containing four toys and said“Wow”(see Figure 1A). Both
recipients simultaneously said “Please” and pushed the two con-
tainers toward the distributor (Figure 1B). The distributor took
the containers, simultaneously placed them on the ﬂoor behind
the table, and appeared to distribute toys into each container;
the containers were occluded from the infant’s view by the table
(Figure 1C). The distributor then held up the now-empty trans-
parent bin, said “All gone” (Figure 1D) and placed the transparent
bin on the table. Next, the distributor lifted identical opaque lids
within the infant’s view and simultaneously lowered them, pre-
tending to cover the containers. In reality, in order to ensure that
distributors were unaware of whether they were acting fairly or
unfairly, distributors did not actually distribute the toys; an iden-
tical set of containers had been pre-prepared with toy allocations,
covered with opaque lids, and hidden behind the table. Then, the
distributor lifted the pre-prepared covered containers so they were
in view of the infant, gave one container to each recipient saying
“here” (Figure 1E), and looked down with her eyes closed (so she
remained unaware of the outcome).
In the outcome phase, the recipients simultaneously lifted
the lids to reveal the number of toys they received and the
infant viewed the static allocation outcome for 20 s (Figure 1F).
Then, the experimenter asked the parent to turn so that the
infant was no longer facing the display and the actors reset the
display.
The infant watched a total of four distribution episodes. Each
distributor distributed a set of green plastic frogs (episodes 1 and
2), and then a set of yellow Lego bricks (episodes 3 and 4). The
outcomes (2:2 versus 1:3) alternated each episode. The ﬁrst out-
come (2:2 versus 1:3), and the side of the advantaged recipient
(left versus right) were counterbalanced across infants. Through-
out the procedure, all actors’ actions were timed to a metronome
to ensure consistency of timing across episodes and across the dif-
ferent distributors. The total duration of each distribution episode
was 85 s.
Choice trials Following the distribution phase, the infant received
three trials in which she could choose between the fair and unfair
distributors. The side of the fair distributor (left or right) was
counterbalanced.
During Trial 1, the infant was seated in the parent’s lap facing
away from the table, at a marked centered location 60 cm from the
display table. The parent was instructed to hold the infant ﬁrmly
by thewaist to keep her in position in themiddle of the parent’s lap.
The fair and unfair distributors sat at the table equidistant from
the infant. To begin the trial, the experimenter asked the parent to
turn to face the display table. After a 3-s delay (to ensure the infant
had adequate time to encode the distributors and their respective
locations), the distributors simultaneously smiled and made eye
contact with the infant, and then simultaneously extended identi-
cal octopus bath toys to the infant at marked locations 80 cm apart
at the edge of the table. After a 3-s delay (to allow the infant to
encode the toys), the experimenter instructed the parent to move
up to the edge of the table with the infant centered between the
distributors. During this response period, the distributors main-
tained eye contact and smiled at the infant in a static position with
their arms extended. The trial ended after the infant took a toy or
after 30 s elapsed. Once the trial ended, the experimenter asked the
parent to move back to their original position facing away from
the display table. If the infant had selected a toy, the experimenter
retrieved it.
Trial 2 was identical to Trial 1, except before offering the toys to
the infant, the distributors simultaneously said, “Wow.” Then the
distributors placed the toys on the table 80 cm apart, and looked
down. The trial ended when the infant took a toy, or after 30 s
elapsed.
Before Trial 3 began, the parent and infant faced the table. Dis-
tributors moved behind the parent to sit on the ﬂoor at marked
locations 2.13 m apart on opposite sides of the room and began
stacking blocks. Next, the experimenter instructed the parent to
turn to face the wall and the infant watched the distributors stack
blocks in an identical manner for 20 s. The experimenter then
instructed the parent to place the infant on a mark equidistant
from the two distributors and release the infant so she was allowed
to move freely. The trial ended when the infant approached a dis-
tributor and interacted with the blocks, or after 45 s elapsed. The
choice was operationalized as the actor toward whom the partic-
ipant moved nearest, as coded by an observer blind to condition
andhypotheses froma video angle perpendicular to the two actors.
Infants had to take at least one step toward an actor to be coded as
an approach.
Ourmotivation for including three different test trial types was
threefold. First, we wanted to investigate infants’ social selections
and afﬁliative patterns generally. We thus sought to feature mul-
tiple test trials that measure the same underlying construct but
that differ in their surface features to better position us to draw
conclusions about infants’ social selections more broadly, versus
their performance on one particular trial type. Second, based on
pilot work we found that by varying the surface features of the
test trials we could increase both the number of trials we could
administer as well as the number of trials that infants made a
choice on, by decreasing boredom, inattentiveness and fussiness.
Finally, the use of three unique trials allowed us to strike a balance
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FIGURE 1 | Fair distribution episode (see left column) and unfair
distribution episode (see right column). (A)The distributor lifted up a
transparent bin containing four toys and said “Wow!” (B) Both recipients
simultaneously said “Please” and pushed the two containers toward the
distributor. (C)The distributor pretended to distribute toys into the container
on her left side (pictured), and then the container on her right side (not
pictured). (D)The distributor held up the empty transparent bin and said “All
gone!” (E)The distributor gave one container to each recipient saying “here.”
(F)The distributor looked down with her eyes closed, and the recipients
simultaneously lifted the lids to reveal the number of toys they received.
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between (a) the task’s resemblance to a true social interaction, (b)
the likelihood that the task would induce stranger anxiety, and (c)
standardizing actors’ interactions with the infant. Trials 1 and 2
require the infant select a toy offered by an actor andwere designed
to minimize stranger anxiety, while Trial 3 requires that the infant
approach an actor and may be a more direct selection of a social
partner. Using toys rather than a direct interaction also helped
to achieve this balance, allowing tasks that were sufﬁciently social
while reducing stranger anxiety; pilot work revealed that tasks in
which infants select toys offered by experimenters reduced indices
of stranger anxiety than tasks in which infants interacted with the
experimenters directly. Another beneﬁt of using toys is that it elim-
inated actors’ contingent responding to the infants, ensuring the
different actors’ interactions with the infant were identical within
each testing session and across different testing sessions.
Coding and reliability. Infants’ distributor selections (fair versus
unfair) were coded by a coder unaware of the respective roles of
the distributors. For Trials 1 and 2, infants’ choices were recorded
as the distributor from whom the infant ﬁrst selected the toy. For
Trial 3, infants’ choices were recorded as the distributor whom
infants approached. On the rare occasion the infants approached
both distributors (n = 3), infants’ choices were recorded as the
distributor to whom the infant got closest.
A secondary coder, unaware of the distributors respective roles
and also unaware of the primary coder’s responses, coded 25% of
the sample to establish inter-observer reliability. Coders agreed on
infants’ choices on 100% of trials.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Infants’ selection of the fair distributor
A fair choice score was calculated by dividing the number of fair
distributor choices by the total number of choices in the three
choice trials. Participants were only included in the overall fair
choice score if they made choices on at least two of the three trials;
n = 1 infants in the CF/CUF condition and n = 3 in the AF/CUF
condition were dropped for failing to meet this criteria. Given
that we had a directional prediction that infants’ scores would be
signiﬁcantly above chance, one-tailed p-values are reported.
We ﬁrst investigated whether infants’ overall fair choice score
differed as a function of condition: there was a marginally signif-
icant difference in infants’ selection of the fair distributor in the
CF/CUF condition (Caucasian Fair / Caucasian Unfair,M = 0.72,
SE = 0.05) versus the AF/CUF condition (Asian Fair / Caucasian
Unfair, M = 0.57, SE = 0.09), t(34) = 1.50, p = 0.07, d = 0.51. A
one-sample t-test revealed that infants in the CF/CUF condition
selected the fair actor at rates signiﬁcantly above chance (where
chance = 0.50): t(18) = 4.05, p = 0.0005, d = 1.91 (Figure 2).
However, in the AF/CUF condition, infants’ fair choice scores
did not differ signiﬁcantly from chance, t(16) = 0.79, p = 0.22,
d = 0.40.
To further investigate infants’ fair actor selections within each
condition we conducted binomial tests on each of the test trials. In
the CF/CUF condition, infants selected the fair actor at rates above
chance on two of the three trials: 77% of infants selected the fair
actor on Trial 1 (p = 0.045), 63% of infants selected the fair actor
on Trial 2 (p = 0.18), and 75% of infants selected the fair actor on
FIGURE 2 | Average fair choice scores in the CF/CUF andAF/CUF
conditions. *p < 0.05.
Trial 3 (p = 0.039). In contrast, infants in the AF/CUF condition
selected the fair actor at rates that did not differ from chance on
Trials 1 and 3 (58% selected the fair actor onTrial 1, p= 0.385; 50%
of infants selected the fair actor on Trial 3, p = 1.0) and differed
from chance marginally on Trial 2 (68% of infants selected the fair
actor on Trial 2, p = 0.084)3.
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that infants select distrib-
utors on the basis of prior fair (versus unfair) behavior when the
race of the distributors is held constant, suggesting that infants
prefer to interact with others who abide by fairness norms, at
least under certain circumstances. Thus, our ﬁndings suggest that
by 15 months of age, infants’ fairness concerns guide not only
their visual responses but also their social selections. Importantly,
infants’ preference for the fair actor was present under conditions
in which the actors were acting toward recipients of a different
race. As some scholars have suggested that moral norms are those
that apply universally to members of all social categories, it may
be the case that infants are thus treating fairness violations as
moral transgressions, rather than social conventional violations
(Turiel, 1983). For example, recent work suggests young children
implicitly draw this distinction between moral and conventional
norms; three-year-old children appear to believe thatmoral norms
apply in interactions with both ingroup and outgroup members,
while conventional norms are uniquely restricted to interactions
with ingroup members (Schmidt et al., 2012). Our ﬁndings that
infants appear to recognize fairness norms apply in interactions
with outgroup recipients raises the possibility that infants are sim-
ilarly sensitive to the moral, as opposed to conventional, basis of
fairness norms.
Our ﬁndings also suggest that when fairness and race are pitted
against one another (e.g., fair Asian actor versus unfair Caucasian
actor), there is no evidence that infants systematically select the
fair actor at rates above chance. These ﬁndings suggest that infants
3One potential reason that infants selections on Trial 2 did not differ from chance
may be that Trial 1 demonstrates to the infant that, at least in the context of offering
toys, both actors are equally likely to offer a toy to the infant and thus the infant
chooses randomly on the second trial. An alternative possibility is that because trial
2 is similar to trial 1, infants may feel the actors are encouraging them to make a
different choice.
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may attempt to integrate both social category information, oper-
ationalized here as race, and social history, operationalized here
as prior fair and unfair behavior, in making their social selections
and that these factors compete with one another in infants’ social
decision making.
EXPERIMENT 2
The results of Experiment 1 established that infants systematically
select fair distributors when race is kept constant. However, when
race is pitted against fair behavior infants do not systematically
select the fair actor. Experiment 2 asked whether, in addition to
considering race and fairness in their social selections, infants also
consider the racial identity of the advantaged individual.
Infants were tested in either a Caucasian Fair/Asian Unfair
condition, or an Asian Fair/Caucasian Unfair condition. In both
conditions the recipients consisted of an Asian individual and a
Caucasian individual. For half of the infants in each condition the
Asian individual was advantaged by the unfair actor (e.g., received
more toys); for the remaining half the Caucasian recipient was
advantaged by the unfair actor. Given the results of Experiment
1, suggesting that infants consider both race and fairness in their
selections, we thought it was unlikely that infants would select
actors solely on the basis of prior fair behavior (e.g., systematically
picking the fair actor), or solely on the basis of race (e.g., system-
atically selecting the Caucasian actor). Instead, we predicted one
of two patterns of results.
The ﬁrst possibility is that infants may select the fair actor over
the unfair actor when the fair actor is Caucasian (and the unfair
actor is Asian), but not when the fair actor is Asian (and the unfair
actor is Caucasian), ignoring the consequences of the fair and
unfair actors’ behavior for the recipients. An alternative possibility
is that infants may consider the consequences of the distributors’
actions for the recipients as a function of the recipients’ racial
identities. For half of the infants in Experiment 2, the unfair actor
advantaged theAsian recipient (over the Caucasian recipient), and
for half of the infants, unfair actor advantaged the Caucasian
recipient (over the Asian recipient). If infants are sensitive to
the consequences of the distributor’s actions for the recipient as
a function of the recipients’ racial identities, then infants’ social
selections may vary as a function of who the unfair actor advan-
tages. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that Caucasian infants would
be more likely to select the fair actor when the unfair actor advan-
taged the recipient that was of a different race than the infant
(i.e., the Asian recipient), than when she advantaged a recipi-
ent that was of the same race as the infant (i.e., the Caucasian
recipient).
METHODS
Participants
Forty 15-month-old Caucasian infants took part in Experiment 2
(19 females; mean age = 15 months, 10 days, range = 14 months,
28 days to 15 months, 27 days). Infants were randomly assigned to
the Caucasian Fair/Asian Unfair condition (henceforth CF/AUF;
n = 20, 10 females, mean age = 15 months, 10 days) or the Asian
Fair/Caucasian Unfair condition (henceforth AF/CUF; n = 20,
9 females, mean age = 15 months, 11 days). All infants were
full-term and typically developing. Participants were recruited
from a database of parents who had volunteered to participate
in experimental studies.
Data from 10 additional infants were excluded due to failure
to respond at all during the choice trials (n = 3 in the CF/AUF
condition, n = 1 in the AF/CUF), fussiness (n = 2 in the CF/AUF
condition, n = 1 in the AF/CUF) or procedural errors (n = 2 in
the CF/AUF condition), or due to parental inﬂuence (n = 1 in the
AF/CUF condition).
Procedure
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except for the race
of the various actors. For both conditions, one distributor was
Caucasian and the other distributor was Asian, and one recipient
was Caucasian and the other recipient was Asian. For each con-
dition, the race of the recipient who received three toys from the
unfair distributor (henceforth, the “advantaged recipient”) was
counterbalanced; for half of the infants in each condition the
advantaged recipient was Caucasian, and for half of the infants
in each condition the advantaged recipient was Asian.
Coding and reliability
Infants’ choices were coded as in Experiment 1. As in Experiment
1, when infants approached both distributors (n = 3), infants’
choices were recorded as the distributor to whom the infant got
closest. A second coder coded 25%of the sample to establish inter-
observer reliability. Coders agreed on the infants’ choices on 100%
of the trials.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Infants’ selection of the fair distributor
As in Experiment 1, a fair choice score was calculated by divid-
ing the number of fair distributor choices by the total number
of choices in the three choice trials. As in Experiment 1, partici-
pants were only included if they made choices on at least two of
the three trials; n = 3 infants in the CF/AUF condition, n = 3
in the AF/CUF condition were dropped for failing to meet this
criteria. Fair choice scores did not signiﬁcantly differ between
the CF/AUF condition (Caucasian Fair/Asian Unfair, M = 0.45,
SE = 0.07) and the AF/CUF condition (Asian Fair/Caucasian
Unfair, M = 0.55, SE = 0.07), t(32) = 1.06, p = 0.15, d = 0.37.
Similarly, fair choice scores did not signiﬁcantly differ from
chance in either the CF/AUF condition: t(16) = 0.75, p = 0.23,
d = 0.38, or the AF/CUF condition: t(16) = 0.75, p = 0.23,
d = 0.38.
Infants’ selection of the fair distributor as a function of the race of
the recipient advantaged by the unfair distributor
We then investigated whether infants’ choices were inﬂuenced by
the race of the advantaged recipient (i.e., the recipient who receives
three toys from the unfair distributor). Overall, there was a sig-
niﬁcant effect of the recipient who was advantaged (i.e. Asian
versus Caucasian) on infants’ selections of the fair distributor,
t(32) = 2.00, p = 0.03, d = 0.71. Infants were more likely to
select the fair actor when the unfair actor advantaged the Asian
recipient,M = 0.59, SE = 0.06, than when the unfair actor advan-
taged the Caucasian recipient, M = 0.42, SE = 0.07 (Figure 3). A
one-sample t-test revealed infants’ selections of the fair actor was
marginally above chance (where chance = 0.50) when the unfair
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FIGURE 3 | Average fair choice scores in Experiment 2 as a function of
the race of the recipient advantaged by the unfair actor. *p < 0.05.
actor advantaged the Asian recipient: t(15) = 1.65, p = 0.06.
Infants’ selections of the fair actor were not signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from chance when the unfair actor advantaged the Caucasian
recipient, t(17) = 1.26, p = 0.13. Performance on individual
test trials was consistent with this pattern of ﬁndings (although
binomial tests on each trial were not signiﬁcant, ps > 0.05, pre-
sumably due to lack of power). When the unfair actor advantaged
the Asian recipient, 73% of infants selected the fair actor on Trial
1, 58% of infants selected the fair actor on Trial 2, and 57% of
infants selected the fair actor on Trial 3. In contrast, when the
unfair actor advantaged the Caucasian recipient, 38% of infants
selected the fair actor on Trial 1, 35% of infants selected the fair
actor on Trial 2, and 47% of infants selected the fair actor on
Trial 3.
The results of the second experiment suggest infants were no
more likely to select the fair distributor than the unfair distributor
when the recipients belonged to different racial categories. How-
ever, infants’ selections varied systematically as a function of the
race of the advantaged recipient; infants were more likely to select
the fair distributor when the unfair distributor advantaged the
Asian recipient. These ﬁndings suggest that infants may also make
social selections based on the consequences that a given individ-
ual’s behavior may have for individuals that are of the same versus
a different race as infants.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our ﬁndings provide evidence that infants select social partners
on the basis of their prior fair versus unfair behavior. Past work
suggests infants expect individuals to distribute goods fairly to
recipients. Our ﬁndings build on thiswork by showing that infants’
fairness concerns also actively guide their social preferences and
social selections. Critically, infants chose to interact with the fair
actor evenwhenboth recipients could be construed as belonging to
a different social category than both the recipients and the infants.
Thus, infants appear to apply fairness norms when the victim
of a fairness violation is of a different social category. Because a
moral norm is often deﬁned as one that is universally applied,
this may provide initial evidence that infants construe fairness
as a moral norm, rather than a social convention (Turiel, 1983).
However, to fully draw this conclusion, future work would need
to address whether infants expect outgroup members to abide by
fairness norms. Future work similar to the current study with
twoAsian distributors (e.g., an Asian Fair/Asian Unfair condition)
could provide evidence to support this conclusion.
An outstanding question concerns whether infants’ social selec-
tions reﬂect the formation of overarching evaluations: forming a
positive evaluation of individuals who behave fairly and a neg-
ative evaluation of individuals who behave unfairly, and using
these evaluations to guide their social selections. Alternatively,
infants’ choices may merely reﬂect self-interested concerns about
thepossible consequences of future interactions between the infant
and potential social partners. Future work may disentangle these
possibilities.
Another open question is how infants’ awareness of such norms
differs from that of older children. Our ﬁndings suggest that
infants have an emerging understanding of fairness norms that
operate according to (at least) some of the same moral principles
as adults and older children. However, we assume infants’ aware-
ness of such norms is primarily implicit. A critical question for
future work concerns how children develop an explicit awareness
of fairness norms and other socio-moral considerations.
The ﬁndings of Experiment 1 also indicated, however, that
when distributor race is pitted against prior fair behavior, infants
do not systematically select the fair distributor. These ﬁndings
suggest infants attempt to incorporate information about the indi-
viduals’ races when making social selections, and may weigh race
and fairness as competing dimensions in their social selections.
An alternative explanation for the ﬁndings of Experiment 1 is
that infants may struggle to incorporate multiple social dimen-
sions when making social selections, such that when two or more
dimensions are present, infants select social partners at chance.
However, this explanation is ruled out by the ﬁndings of Exper-
iment 2, in which fairness was crossed with both the race of the
distributor and the race of the recipient and infants selected social
partners systematically based on who (i.e., which race recipient)
the unfair distributor advantaged.
Experiment 2 demonstrated that infants were more likely to
select the fair actorwhen theunfair actor advantaged anAsian indi-
vidual than when she advantaged a Caucasian individual. Given
that all of the infants in the sample were Caucasian, these ﬁnd-
ings may suggest that over and above whether an actor behaves
fairly, infants may focus on the consequences of the distribution
for members of their own race and its implications for their own
future interactions with the distributors, as it may be advanta-
geous to interact with a person who shows preferential treatment
to the infant’s own race. Infants may prefer the fair distributor in
this situation either because the unfair distributor (a) advantaged
the Asian recipient, or (b) disadvantaged the Caucasian recipi-
ent. Because the unfair distributor both gave more goods to the
Asian recipient than did the fair distributor, and fewer goods to
the Caucasian recipient than did the fair distributor, the current
study does not address this question. However, previous studies
suggest infants’ preferences may be based on both of these aspects;
14-month-old infants prefer agents who help a puppet that is sim-
ilar to the infant (e.g., prefers the same kind of food), but prefer
agents who harm a puppet that is dissimilar (e.g., prefers different
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foods) (Hamlin et al., 2013). Future studies may cleave apart these
two possibilities by introducing one distributor who gives more to
the Asian recipient (but gives the same amount to the Caucasian
recipient as does the fair distributor), and one who disadvantages
the Caucasian recipient (but gives the same amount to the Asian
recipient as does the fair distributor).
An additional question concerns whether infants are making
their social selections based on shared category membership with
the agents involved in the display (e.g., based on the fact that the
infant and agents are of the same race) or in terms of considera-
tions for Caucasian recipients per se. Because all of the participants
in the current study were Caucasian, the current study cannot dis-
tinguishbetween these possibilities. If infants’choices are drivenby
shared category membership, future studies using the same design
as Experiment 2 with Asian participants should yield an oppo-
site pattern of ﬁndings (e.g., selections of the fair actor should be
higher when the unfair actor advantages the Caucasian recipient).
This is likely the case, given that Asian and Caucasian infants have
shown opposite looking time patterns in investigations of infants’
perception of Asian versus Caucasian faces, i.e., Asian infants
look longer at Asian faces and Caucasian infants look longer at
Caucasian faces (Kelly et al., 2007).
A related question concerns whether infants’ fairness concerns
guide their selection of social partners when both the fair and
unfair individuals are of another race, e.g., if Caucasian infants
were given the option between fair and unfair actors who are
both Asian. Our work suggests that Caucasian infants do prefer
fair actors over unfair actors when they are both Caucasian, so
it is reasonable to expect this would be the case when they are
both Asian. An alternative possibility is that Caucasian infants
do not have any expectations about how other-race actors should
distribute goods. Given, however, that infants in Experiment 2
selectively chose fair actors when the unfair actor advantaged
an Asian recipient, it suggests Caucasian infants may hold Asian
actors to the same principles as Caucasian actors, and that one
would see this same pattern if both fair and unfair actors were
Asian.
The extent to which infants focus on the consequences of
the distribution for members of their own race parallels simi-
lar ﬁndings with adults: although adults who had been divided
into artiﬁcial groups (ostensibly based on perceptual processing
styles) condemned ingroup favoritism, they tended to have an
implicit preference for a person who showed ingroup favoritism
over a person whowas egalitarian (Castelli et al., 2008). Systematic
biases for ingroup members do not appear to emerge until 3 or
4 years of age (Katz and Kofkin, 1997; Dunham et al., 2013); how-
ever, our ﬁndings may signal the onset of an emerging implicit
awareness of social categories and the implications of these cate-
gories for people’s real-world behavior and consequences of this
behavior.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with previous studies showing that
race affects infants’ visual attention, leading to a preference for
looking at own- versus other-race individuals (Kelly et al., 2005).
However, our ﬁndings go beyond looking preferences, which may
rely on lower-level processes, and suggest infants actively use
this information to coordinate their social selections. The cur-
rent ﬁndings are in contrast to some previous work on infants’
social preferences that ﬁnds that infants do not consider race
when given the opportunities to select toys associated with White
versus Blacks actors (Kinzler and Spelke, 2011). One possibil-
ity for this difference is that in our procedure infants observed
and interacted with live (as opposed to televised) adults; thus,
it is possible infants perceived our task as having realistic conse-
quences for future interactions with these individuals. Another
strength of the current study is that we utilized multiple exem-
plars of Caucasian and Asian individuals, in multiple different
pairings, which de-conﬂates race and personal identity. Thus, our
ﬁndings could not be accounted for by a preference for one a par-
ticular individual over another. Moreover, because infants were
recruited from different locales across these studies, it is possi-
ble the extent of infants’ exposure to same- and other-race adults
may have differed. One possibility is that infants in more racially
diverse cities may have more exposure to other-race individuals
and may be less likely to use race as a marker of social category
membership.
In conclusion, the results of the current study suggest that
infants can use fairness concerns to guide their social selections.
However, infants also take into consideration the race of individ-
uals, and the consequences of the behavior of these individuals
for their own- versus other-race individuals. Indeed, the results of
Experiment 2 suggest that when given the opportunity to select
individuals on the basis of fairness, on the basis of race, or based
on the consequences of the distributor’s actions for own- ver-
sus other-race individuals, infants most strongly consider the
consequences for own- versus other-race members. These ﬁnd-
ings may suggest that when confronted with selecting between
individuals on the basis of who abides by a fairness norm ver-
sus on the basis of who advantages own-race (versus other-race)
individuals, infants may more strongly weight the consequences
for individuals of their own race, and, by extension, for the
self. Thus, infants may strategically select social partners who
previously advantaged members of their own social category,
suggesting that theymayuse groupmembership topredict the con-
sequences of future interactions for themselves. Thus, our work
is consistent with the conclusion that infants and young children
may be strategic in their prosocial considerations (Dunﬁeld and
Kuhlmeier, 2010; Vaish et al., 2010; Shaw et al., 2012), factoring
in not only whether an individual acts fairly, but also the poten-
tial consequences of this behavior for their own interactions with
others.
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